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Notes
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CIVIL RIGHTS-RGHT OF JEHOvAHWS
WITNESSES TO DISTRIBUTE AND SELL THEm LITERATURE UPON THE
STREETS OF AN UNINCORPORATED, PRIVATELY-OWNED COlvnVIUNrry-
The appellant, a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses sect, was en-
gaged in distributing religious literature on the streets of an un-
incorporated community owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corpo-
ration. She was arrested and charged with violating a state sta-
tute1 which made it a crime to enter or remain on the premises of
another after having been properly warned. Held, an applica-
tion of the statute would deprive the appellant of her constitu-
tional rights to freedom of press and religion as guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Liberty of press
and religion overrode the technical proprietary interests involved.
Marsh v. State of Alabama, 66 S.Ct. 276 (U.S. 1946).
On the same day the court handed down another decision
involving facts similar to those in the Marsh case. However, this
case involved the use of the streets of a village owned by the
federal government to house defense workers. Applying the rule
of the Marsh case, the same result was reached. Tucker v. State
of Texas, 66 S.Ct. 274 (U.S. 1946).2
One with an elementary knowledge of constitutional law is
aware of the great mass of cases that have been brought by the
Jehovah's Witnesses to protect and maintain their interest in
going about the country preaching their gospel and selling their
literature.3 Various statutes and ordinances have been employed
in an attempt to regulate and police the coast-to-coast activities
of these colporteurs, but the constitutional axe, as wielded by the
Supreme Court, has greatly limited their effect.
These ordinances take various forms. Some require a license
to be issued either without cost or upon payment of a nominal
fee but in the discretion of a municipal officer. This type of regu-
1. Ala. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 14, § 426.
2. It is interesting to note that the appeal to the United States Supreme
Court was direct from the County Court of Medina County, Texas. As this
was the highest Texas court which, under Texas procedure, had authority
to hear the case, direct appeal was allowed to the United States Supreme
Court based on the federal question involved.
3. Waite, The Debt of Constitutional Law to Jehovah's Witnesses (1944)
28 Minn. L. Rev. 209.
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latory measure has uniformly been held invalid.4  Others require
the payment of a license tax for the privilege of soliciting or ped-
dling and this has been found to be a tax on a constitutional priv-
ilege and consequently invalid.5 Reasonable regulation, designed
to keep the streets and other public areas clear and free of dis-
turbance, has been sustained" as an exercise of the police power.
The test of reasonableness is seemingly a matter to be decided
according to the facts of each case and no absolute criterion has
been laid down. The courts have experienced little difficulty in
sustaining regulation which involved commercial advertising.7
It is interesting to note that the dissent in Murdock v. Pennsyl-
vania" classified the activities of Jehovah's Witnesses as commer-
cial. Adoption of such an interpretation could have the effect of
overruling all the decisions that have upheld their sales activities
under the guise of religious freedom.
4. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949 (1938);
Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940); Valen-
tine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 62 S.Ct. 920, 86 L.Ed. 1262 (1942); Largent v.
Texas, 318 U.S. 418, 63 S.Ct. 667, 87 L.Ed. 873 (1943); Kennedy v. City of
Moscow, 39 F. Supp. 26 (D.C. Idaho 1941); Borchert v. City of Ranger, 42
F. Supp. 577 (D.C. Tex. 1941); State ex rel. Hough v. Woodruff, 147 Fla. 299,
2 So. (2d) 577 (1941); Village of South Holland v. Stein, 373 Ill. 472, 26 N.E.
(2d) 868 (1940); Township of Maplewood v. Albright, 13 N.J. Misc. 46, 176
Atl. 194 (C.P. 1934); Dziatkiewicz v. Township of Maplewood, 115 N.J. Law 37,
178 Ati. 205 (1935); Borough of Edgewater v. Cox, 123 N.J. Law 212, 8 A. (2d)
375 (1939).
5. Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 62 S.Ct. 1231, 86 L.Ed. 1691
(1942); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 63 S.Ct. 870, 87 L.Ed. 1292
(1943); Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 64 S.Ct. 717, 88 L.Ed. 938
(1944); Busey v. District of Columbia, 138 F. (2d) 592 (App. D.C. 1943); State
ex rel. Singleton v. Woodruff, 153 Fla. 84, 13 So. (2d) 704 (1943); Thomas v.
City of Atlanta, 59 Ga. 520, 1 S.E. (2d) 598 (1939); City of Blue Island v.
Kozul, 379 Ill. 511, 41 N.E. (2d) 515 (1942); People v. Gage, 38 N.Y.S. (2d) 817
(Cy. ct. 1942); McConkey v. City of Fredericksburg, 179 Va. 556, 19 S.E. (2d)
682 (1942).
6. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 61 S.Ct. 762, 85 L.Ed. 1049
(1941); Mickey v. Kansas City, 43 F. Supp. 739 (D.C. Mo. 1942); City of Chi-
cago v. Rhine, 363 Ill. 619, 2 N.E. (2d) 905 (1936); Almassi v. City of Newark,
8 N.J. Misc. 420, 150 AtI. 217 (Cy. Ct. 1930), as examples of reasonable regu-
lation and a valid exercise of the police power. Practically all the Supreme
Court decisions dealing with this question contain dicta to the effect that
reasonable regulation is valid.
7. Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155
(1939); Town of Green River v. Fuller Brush Co., 65 F. (2d) 112 (C.C.A. 10th,
1933); Cook v. City of Harrison, 180 Ark. 546, 21 S.W. (2d) 966 (1929); where
religious book salesmen were held to be subject to a tax on commercial
peddlers, Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. v. City of Bellevue, 283 Ky. 152, 140 S.W.
(2d) 1024 (1940).
8. "In our Judgment, however, the plan of national distribution by the
Watch Tower Bible & Tract Society, with its wholesale prices of five or
twenty cents per copy for books, delivered to the public by the witnesses at
twenty-five cents per copy, justifies the characterization of the transaction
as a sale.... The quid pro quo is demanded." 319 U.S. 105, 119, 63 S.Ct. 891,
87 L.Ed. 1292, 1301 (1943).
A third type of ordinance forbids the uninvited peddler,
hawker, or itinerant vendor to go upon private property for the
purpose of soliciting or selling. The vendor is forbidden to make
house-to-house calls and knock upon the door without express
permission. Treatment of this type of ordinance in the various
jurisdictions has not been uniform. Presented with a case in-
volving this question, the Supreme Court in 1943 held such an
ordinance unconstitutional as applied to Jehovah's Witnesses.,
However, it indicated that an ordinance whose prohibition was
conditioned upon notice to "keep out," given in "suitable fashion"
by the owner or occupant, would be valid.10
The basic issue in these cases might be termed simply "pri-
vate property versus religious freedom." In Martin v. Struthersm "
the Court found the balancing of the confficting interests involved
to be its major task. The judgment of the community could not
be substituted for the judgment of the individual householder or
property owner with respect to his interest in the free dissemina-
tion of information and ideas. On the other hand, the age-old
concept that "a man's home is his castle," still has substance.
The homeowner can prevent even one disseminating religious
literature from remaining on his premises once he has been
ordered off and, if proper notice be given, can exclude the latter
in advance.12
Is the result to be the same where the property is larger and
where the degree of control is less than in the individual home?
The court has found that those disseminating religious informa-
tion are not free to go from room to room in a hotel against the
wishes of the owner and remain there after they have been
9. Ordinances ruled out: Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147,
60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939); Zimmerman v. Village of London, 38 F.
Supp. 582 (D.C. Ohio 1941).
Ordinances upheld: Town of Green River v. Fuller Brush Co., 65 F. (2d)
112 (C.C.A. 10th, 1933) (commercial soliciting involved); City of Shreveport
v. Cunningham, 190 La. 481, 182 So. 649 (1938) (peddlers forbidden to call at
residences with certain enumerated exceptions-direct test of constitution-
ality), noted in (1939) 1 LOUISANA LAW REVIEW 455; People v. Bohnke, 287
N.Y. 154, 88 N.E. (2d) 478 (1941).
10. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 63 S.Ct. 862, 87 L.Ed. 1313
(1943).
11. The court found it must weigh "the conflicting interests of the appel-
lant in the civil rights she claims, as well as the right of the individual
householder to determine whether he is willing to receive her message,
against the interests of the community which by this ordinance offers to pro-
tect the interests of all of its citizens, whether particular citizens want that
protection or not." 319 U.S. 141, 143, 63 S.Ct. 862, 863, 87 L.Ed. 1313, 1317.
12. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 63 S.Ct. 862, 87 L.Ed. 1313 (1943);
De Berry v. City of La Grange, 8 S.E. (2d) 146 (Ga. App. 1940).
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ordered out.13 The degree of control exercised in this case em-
powers the owner to exclude those who are undesirable.
The Louisiana court, in passing on a phase of this question,
ruled that once a representative of Jehovah's Witnesses had been
ordered off a plantation, he had no right thereafter to call upon
the tenants on the same plantation. 4 The concept of private
property is extended here to give the owner full and complete
control over all parts of the plantation. The court stated that
"guaranties of freedom of religious worship ... do not sanction
trespass in the name of freedom .... Personal liberty ends where
the rights of others begin. ' 15
It has been held that the owner of an apartment house could
not prevent members of this sect from calling on those of his
tenants who desired an interview and permitted entrance by lift-
ing the lock to the vestibule door in the lobby.' Here we have
a clash of interests-those of the real owner of the property and
the interests of the tenant, who can be likened unto a home-
owner. It is well to emphasize the license which the court found
the Witnesses had been granted; for the defiance of a property
right is not to be found so readily when, in reality, entrance is
gained through an easement within the power of the tenant to
grant. But why should not the plantation tenants in Louisiana,"7
as occupants of separate houses, be deemed to have within their
power the right to grant a similar easement? The right to do so
would rest on the protection of their interests to receive the full
benefits of freedom of press and religion. 18
This right of easement possessed by an apartment dweller
is in reality only one step removed from the right of the residents
of a privately owned, unincorporated community to have the
streets open for the general advantage of all inhabitants. As a
practical matter, an express license cannot be found; but, if a
close analogy were desired, a license could be implied to those
who desired the use of the streets for such purposes as have been
dealt with here.
13. People v. Vaughan, 150 P. (2d) 964 (Calif. App. 1944).
14. State v. Martin, 199 La. 39, 5 So. (2d) 377 (1941).
15. 199 La. 39, 48, 5 So. (2d) 377, 380.
16. Commonwealth v. Richardson, 313 Mass. 632, 48 N.E. (2d) 678 (1943).
17. State v. Martin, 199 La. 39, 5 So. (2d) 377 (1941).
18. Still more speculation arises over whether or not Martin v. City of
Struthers, decided two years after this case, has the effect of overruling the
.Louisiana decision. The Supreme Court in unequivocal words made it plain
that "Freedom to distribute information to every citizen wherever he desires
to receive it is so clearly vital to the preservation of a free society that...
it must be fully preserved." (Italics supplied.) 319 U.S. 141, 146, 63 S.Ct.
862, 865, 87 L.Ed. 1313, 1319 (1943). The application of such language would,
in this writer's opinion, overrule the Louisiana decision in State v. Martin.
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The instant case extends the principle no further than the
court had previously gone in protecting such other interest as
that recognized in the right to picket even on the property of the
employeri 9 and that recognized in allowing an employee to solicit
uhion membership upon the employer's property. 20  The court
has experienced no difficulty in preventing this interference.
A distinction is noted between the invasion of private pidp-
ei'ty for commercial ends and an invasion in the furtherance of
religious principles. The attitude of the courts makes it clear
that the advertiser and Fuller Brush salesman will not be af-
forded the same protection granted the colporteur and the pick-
eteer.2 1 The explanation of this distinction derives from the
types of interests being protected.
It remairs to be seen to what extent freedom of religion and
expression will brush aside private property concepts. The ques-
tion as it now stands cannot be considered as finally settled, for
the Supreme Court is split on this general issue and a change of
personnel may bring with it a change in constitutional interpreta-
tion with respect to this question.
GEORGE D. ERNEST, JR.
CRIMINAL LAW-BURGLARY IN THE NIGHTTrnvm-Defendant was
convicted on a charge of breaking and entering in the nighttime
with intent to steal.' The sole witness testified that the defend-
ant broke and entered the burglarized apartment "at night"
"between six and seven." Upon further interrogation she de-
clared that the breaking and entering was at the time of day
when it is "just getting dark." Official records show that the sun
set at 8:04 p.m. on the day of the burglary. The siipreme court
upheld the jury's finding tiat the crime had been committed
after sunset. Chief Justice O'Niell and Justice Higgins dissented
on the ground that the witness' testimony clearly showed the
breaking and entering to have been in the daytime. State v. Mc-
Donell. 23 So. (2d) 230 (La. 1945).
i9. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736; 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940) is
illustrative of this right.
20. Republic Aviation. Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board
324 Uq.S. 793, 65 S.Ct. 982, 89 L.Ed. 914 (1945).
21. See cases cited supra note 6.
1. The offense had been committed prior to the effective date of the
Criminal Code; and the prosecution, therefore, was under Section 851 of the
Revised Statutes as amended by La. Act 71 of 1926. This statute was super-
seded by Art. 60, La. Crim. Code of 1942, and the offense is now designated
as "burglary in the nighttime."
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